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ABSTRACT 
This study carries out a systematic review on related empirical literature on the role 
of liquidity on banks’ performance as well as risk-taking. The review of existing literature 
revealed that bank’s liquidity has significant influence on banking outcomes such as banks 
performance, banks risk-taking behaviour, moral hazard, and other financial risks. However, 
we find that empirical evidence on all these is majorly skewed toward developed market. 
Therefore, we recommend that further studies in this area to provide additional insight for 
understanding of the impact of liquidity on the performance as well as the risk-taking 
behaviour and moral hazard. Thus, policy makers, banking regulators shareholder and other 
stakeholders will be properly guided on the potential impact of banks’ liquidity and their 
performance and risk-taking behaviour. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Banks’ liquidity has been one of the interesting topics in the field of banking and 
finance since the aftermath of the 2007-2008 Global Financial Crisis (GFC). This is because 
abundant liquidity at the United State (US) banks derived the high risk-taking that had led to 
the 2007-2008 GFC. In addition, liquidity risk has been identified as one of the major factors 
that had led to the collapsed of banks across the globe during the crisis period. As a result, 
banking reforms by policy makers such as the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision 
(BCBS) has initiated new standards on liquidity to mitigate banks’ liquidity risk as an effort 
to reduce the possibility of a bank run and ensure the long-term stability in the banking 
industry. The two liquidity standards are the Liquidity Coverage Ratio (LCR) which requires 
banks to keep liquid assets that can cover at least thirty days of cash outflows during the 
crisis period. Also, the LCR are required to be held in the High-Quality Liquid Assets 
(HQLA). While the Net Stable Funding Ratio (NSFR) which require the bank funding of the 
medium and long-term loans to be carried out with stable funds that may not run during the 
crisis period (BCBS, 2010).  
Similarly, academic scholars have emphasised the importance banks’ liquidity as well 
as its effects on the banks. For example, DeYoung and Jang (2016) stated that the Basel III 
standard is tantamount to the Tirole (2011) analysis for bank liquidity that centres on three 
main areas: maintaining liquid assets to aid short-term financing runs; issuing stable deposits 
that may not run; and holding significant levels of equity financing to indicate long-term 
solvency and thus minimise the possibility of runs. Also, scholars such as Acharya and Naqvi 
(2012); Drehmann and Nikolaou (2013); King (2013); Hong et al. (2015); Khan et al. (2015); 
Umar and Sun (2016); Huynh and Cong (2017); Dahir et al. (2017); Barua (2017); Hye and 
Lau (2017); Scheule and Wu (2017); Abobakr (2017); Raweh and Shihadeh (2017); and 
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Rahma (2017) have divergent views and found that liquidity has significant effect on the 
bank risk-taking, liquidity creation as well as the performance.  
Extant literature provided divergent views on the effects liquidity on banks. Also, the 
studies focus more on developed and transition economy which led to the paucity of studies 
on the issue of bank liquidity. For example, studies by Aizenman and Hoffmaister (2004); 
Aspachs et al. (2005); Berger and Bouwman (2009); Delechat et al. (2012); and Kashyap et 
al. (2002) provided an empirical benchmarks for considering the impact of liquidity 
regulations on banks and other sectors of the economy. They found that liquidity cushions are 
positively correlated with bank deposit and bank profitability but negatively related to bank 
size, market concentration, and the business cycle. Other studies by Bonner (2015); Bonner et 
al. (2016); and King (2013) maintained that though liquidity buffer help to reduce the banks 
risk-taking behaviour, however, it negatively affects liquidity creation as well as their 
performance. Accordingly, studies by Acharya and Naqvi (2012); Dahir et al. (2017); Hong 
et al. (2015); and Khan et al. (2017) are of the view that bank liquidity influences their risk-
taking behaviour as well as performance.    
The purpose of this paper is to review empirical studies on the effect of bank liquidity 
on their risk-taking behaviour and show other directions for future research. This would 
provide additional insights to researchers, policy makers, and other stakeholders a better 
understanding of the various factors that affects the banks liquidity. The paper only covers 
empirical studies that mainly focus on bank liquidity buffer which are accessible to the 
researchers as at the time of the study. 
Our paper differs from existing literature survey that have focused mainly on factor 
such as risk-taking behaviour of Islamic banks (Mairafi et al., 2018), financial stability, 
(Belouafi et al., 2015; Odeduntan & Adewale, 2015) and the rate of return risk of Islamic 
banking and finance (Zainol & Kassim, 2012). However, none of these studies focused on the 
banks’ liquidity which is the main factor that influences the banks’ risk-taking, banks 
performance as well as their stability. Also, this paper focuses mainly on the more recent 
studies on banks’ liquidity and its effects on banks. 
  The rest of the paper proceeds are as follows: theoretical insight on the bank 
liquidity, empirical studies on banks’ liquidity buffer and their effects, and discusses the 
empirical studies on bank liquidity and risk-taking behaviour. Finally, concludes the study. 
THEORETICAL INSIGHT ON BANK LIQUIDITY 
Liquidity creation and delegated monitoring are among the key roles of banks as 
pointed out by the financial intermediation theory (Berger & Bouwman, 2009; Diamond, 
1984). Berger and Bouwman (2009); Diamond (1984); and Holmstrom and Tirole (1998) 
explained that banks create liquidity to customers by making available sufficient funds for 
their withdrawal needs. Also, banks transform risk by extending riskless deposits to finance 
risky loans while earning returns from the risk transfer functions. Thus, the liquidity 
provision role of banks required that banks maintain a reasonable amount of liquidity to 
discharge their obligations promptly. Banks ensure prompt and consistent liquidity creation 
by hedging against liquidity shortfalls by way of maintaining cash and cash equivalents.  
Though banks are required to maintain a liquidity buffer to mitigate liquidity risk and 
to insure against liquidity shocks, it is argued that maintaining high levels of assets liquidity 
can increase the bank risk. Hong et al. (2014) revealed that systematic liquidity risk was the 
main cause of bank failures occurring over the 2009 to 2010 period in the aftermath of the 
2007-2008 GFC. Liquidity risk could lead to bank failures through systematic and 
idiosyncratic channels. In addition, Acharya and Naqvi (2012) and Wagner (2007) have 
shown that short-term liquidity have implications for bank risk-taking and bank stability.  
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On the other hand, the theory of delegated monitoring explained that banks play a as 
role as delegated monitors that invest on behalf of their customers (Diamond, 1984). This role 
could create an agency problem such as the conflict of interest between the capital providers 
and the business overseers as explained by agency theory (Jensen & Mecking, 1976). Mairafi 
et al. (2018) stated that the banks’ incentives for risk-taking stemmed from their role as 
delegated monitors that invest in financial assets on behalf of their clients. Thus, banks in 
their desire to improve performance and increase returns would give priority to self-most 
profiting venture such as issuing out more loans to the disadvantage of their depositors and 
other stakeholders. In line with this, Acharya and Naqvi (2012) in their model have shown 
how an agency problem aggravates the banks high risk-taking behaviour. In their model, they 
elucidated that an agency problem prevails in the bank whenever there is an excessive 
liquidity which stem from large deposit inflows. Thus, banks allocating more funds to loans 
to increase performance. Consequently, this could lead to high loan growth and loan 
concentration. Bacha (1998), Gonzalez-Hermosillo (1999), and Laeven (1999) argued that 
high loan growth and loan concentration are signs of banks poor diversification strategy and 
high risk-taking that can expose banks to financial risks such as credit risk and liquidity risk. 
Therefore, the bank risk-taking behaviour is reveals on their assets portfolio, profitability and 
eventually leads to banks failure. 
EMPIRICAL INSIGHT 
According to the BCBS (2008), bank liquidity is the ability to fund increases in assets 
and meet obligations as they come due, without incurring unacceptable losses. The definition 
by the BCBS combined both the funding liquidity and the liquidity risk because the primary 
role of banks as financial intermediaries inherently exposes them to liquidity risk. In this 
paper, we define the two terms separately because they are measure using separate ratios. 
Thus, liquidity referred to funding liquidity which is the ability of banks to be prompt and 
consistent in discharging their obligations as a financial intermediary. Liquidity risk is 
defined as the possibility that a bank can meet up to its obligations without disposing its 
liquid asset at an unbearable loss. Similarly, liquidity risk may occur when the borrowers are 
unable to pay back loans at a maturity time. In line with this, Petria and Petria (2009) defined 
liquidity risk as the inherent due to the fact that a borrower may default position as they fall 
due.  
The strand of literature  such as Agénor et al. (2004); Aspachs et al. (2005); Berger 
and Bouwman (2009); Delechat et al. (2012); and Kashyap et al. (2002) provided an 
empirical benchmarks for considering the impact of liquidity regulations on banks and other 
sectors of the economy. They found that liquidity cushions are positively correlated with 
bank deposit and bank profitability but negatively related to bank size, market concentration, 
and the business cycle. In addition, liquidity cushion affects liquidity creation. 
For example, Kashyap et al. (2002) considered the two key functions of banks, 
acceptance of deposits and granting of loans as one of the functions that require a bank to 
maintain liquidity buffer to meet with withdrawal demands of different customers. This is 
because an approved lending or line of credit is nothing more than a deposits account with a 
negative balance since it allows the customer the right to withdraw on demand as depositors. 
As such, the synergy between the two roles required a bank to have more buffers to cater for 
customers demand. Agénor et al. (2004) have shown that the reserve requirements funding 
costs of a bank are related to liquidity risk and output volatility. Furthermore, Aspachs et al. 
(2005) assessed the effect of the liquidity buffer on two perspectives; one from the 
perspective of the central banks support during the crisis period, and two from the perspective 
of the bank itself. They found that the more support by the central banks, especially during 
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crisis period, the lower the liquidity cushion bank maintain. Two, the countercyclical 
liquidity buffer has effects on the bank lending policy. 
A study by Berger and Bouwman (2009) applied the model they developed on a 
sample of the US banks from the period 1993-2003. They reported that bank liquidity 
creation constantly increases throughout the period of their studies. They further revealed that 
liquidity creation is related to the bank size and it is positively related to the bank value. 
Supporting this finding, Delechat et al. (2012) used a sample of 100 banks from the Central 
American region and concluded that bank liquidity buffer and liquidity creation are related to 
bank size, capitalisation, and profitability. Similarly, Allen et al. (2012) maintained that to 
comply with the new liquidty standard, banks will be forced to maitain more liquid assets 
which will have an impact on the banks’ liquidity management as well as their customers. 
Allen et al. (2012) further argued that the new requirement could dwindle the supply of credit 
to small business which are an important sector of the economy. Thus, the standard will 
provide more harm than good. 
Recent study by Bonner et al. (2015) used data from 30 different countries and found 
that the correlations of bank liquidity buffers (e.g., liquid assets-to-deposits, liquid assets-to-
total assets) with deposit liabilities, market concentration, and bank size are substantially 
weaker in countries with bank liquidity regulations. They concluded that liquidity regulations 
act as substitutes for (i.e., reduce) active liquidity management of banks. The implication 
suggests that the liquidity regulations guide the banks’ risk-taking behaviour. Thus,  it will 
help to mitigate the exceesive risk-taking behaviour of banks particularly, as the liquidity 
regulation providing a benchmark which a bank should maintain at any particular period. 
Supporting this view, Bonner (2016) examined the effects of regulatory liquidity coverage 
ratios on 17 banks in the Netherlands, and concludes that liquidity regulation has real effects, 
causing banks to increase their investments in government bonds and decrease their 
investments in loans. Thus, the liquidity standard relatively controls the banks risk-taking 
behaviour on one hand, however, on the other hand it could have negative impact on the 
profitability of banks, since loans has been identified as the major source of revenue for 
banks. In addition, this may lead to assets concentration and eventually expose banks to 
liquidity risk. 
Umar et al. (2016) in their study distinguished the terms funding liquidity, liquidity 
creation, and stock liquidity (referred to as bank liquidity) and use NSFR to proxy for funding 
liquidity and stock liquidity to proxy for stock illiquidity. Using three-stage least square 
estimations simultaneously and examines a sample of 188 banks operating in Brazil, Russia, 
India, China and South Africa (BRICS) for the period 2007-2014. Their finding revealed that 
the liquidity creation has a significant negative effect on funding liquidity. In other words, an 
increase in liquidity creation directly result in decrease in funding liquidity, and there is no 
evidence showing reversibility, which means that funding liquidity has not an effect on 
liquidity creation. If stock liquidity becomes higher, it impacts negatively on liquidity 
creation. In other words, if stock illiquidity becomes higher, liquidity creation also gets high, 
but variation is stock liquidity cannot be explained by variation in liquidity creation. 
Nonetheless, there is a direct effect of stock liquidity on funding liquidity, but stock liquidity 
can influence funding liquidity through liquidity creation. 
Accordingly, other strand of literature focused on the impact of liquidity on the banks’ 
risk-taking behaviour. This is because of the significant specific characteristics of the banking 
sector. For instance, banking has other information asymmetry that exists between owners 
and managers. These include the asymmetric information between the depositors, the bank 
and the regulator, also between the owners, the managers, and the regulators, and between the 
borrowers, the managers and the regulators (Garcia-Marco & Robles-Fernandez, 2008). The 
information asymmetry resulted to the risk-taking incentives as well as the conflict of interest 
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between the capital providers and the business overseers. For example, shareholders are 
willing to take on high-risk projects that maximise their values at the expense of the deposits, 
which could be contrary to the interests of depositors. 
Therefore, banks’ liquidity allows for further understanding of the potential 
relationship between liquidity and risk-taking behaviour of banks in the MENA region as 
there is increasing interest in literature (Andreou et al., 2016; Berger & Bouwman, 2017; 
Dahir et al., 2017; DeYoung & Jang, 2016; Drehmann & Nikolaou, 2013; Francis et al., 
2015; Khan et al., 2017; Lei & Song, 2013; Vazquez & Federico, 2015). 
For example, Drehmann and Nikolaou (2013) concluded that funding liquidity risk is 
associated with the bank risk-taking in the European market, especially during the crisis 
period. Vazquez and Federico (2015) assessed 11,000 banks in the US and Europe during 
2001-2009 period applying probit regression model. Their outcomes reveal that banks with 
lower funding liquidity failed from the onset of the crisis and those with higher ratios of 
equity to asset were more likely to fail after the financial turmoil. Furthermore, the findings 
also documented that bank risk-taking was responsible for likely bank failure. 
Khan et al. (2017) examined how bank’s funding liquidity affect their risk-taking 
behaviour by using the two stages least squares and instrumental variable methods for data 
analysis. Using a sample of 4,749 US Bank Holding Company (BHC) during the period 
1986-2014, their results showed an inverse relationship between the bank funding liquidity 
and their risk-taking behaviour. In another word, whenever the funding of liquidity risk is 
lower, banks take more risk and issue out more loans. Conversely, banks with lower funding 
liquidity risk took on less risk during the 2007-2008 GFC. Similarly, bank size and bank 
capital buffers generally prevented them from high risk-taking. 
Similarly, a study by Dahir et al. (2017) used data from a sample of 57 banks 
operating in BRICS countries during the period 2006-2015 and assessed the relationship 
between funding liquidity risk and bank risk-taking. They found a significant and negative 
relationship between liquidity risk and risk-taking. Also, they found that funding liquidity 
risk have significant effect on bank risk-taking in BRICS countries.  
The relationship between banks’ liquidity and their risk-taking behaviour has been 
empirically explained with relation to the agency problem. The agency problem in the 
banking exists due to the delegated monitoring function of banks which cause conflict of 
interest between the bank managers and the bank owners and information asymmetry. For 
instance, Andreou et al. (2016) empirically investigated the impact of managerial ability on 
banks’ liquidity creation and risk-taking behaviour. Their findings have shown that higher 
ability bank managers create more liquidity and take more risk. However, during the period 
GFC, higher ability managers reduce liquidity creation as a way to de-leverage their balance 
sheets. Khan et al. (2017) found that banks with low funding liquidity risk takes more risk. 
A recent study by Dahir et al. (2017) revealed a significant and negative relationship 
between liquidity risk and the bank risk-taking behaviour. Meanwhile, study by Imbierowicz 
and Rauch (2014) examined the relationship between the two main factors such as liquidity 
risk and credit risk that are related to the reasons for the banks existence which are the 
sources of banks risks. They used dataset of banks from the US during the period 1998-2010 
in assessing the relationship between the two main sources of the bank's risks. They 
concluded that both liquidity risk and credit risk jointly or individually contribute to the bank 
probability of default despite the fact that they are not contemporaneous. This view is 
consistent with the finding of Hong et al. (2014) who examines the potential relation and the 
impact of Basel III liquidity coverage ratio and net stable funding ratio on the bank's failures. 
Employing data from the US banks for the period 2001 to 2011, they reported that the two 
ratios potentially have limited impact on the probability of bank failures, but systemic 
liquidity risk significantly contributes to the bank failures. Vazquez and Federico (2015) 
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studied a higher number of sample banks in the US and Europe within the period 2001 to 
2009. In addition, they argued that higher funding stability measured by net stable funding 
ratio reduces the probability of bank failures. However, they further explained that only 
domestically smaller banks are more exposed to liquidity risk while larger international banks 
are more exposed to solvency risk because of higher leverage. 
CONCLUSION 
The issue of liquidity and its effect on the banks has become an area of interest in the 
banking and financial literature, yet the empirical evidence majorly focuses on developed 
market with relatively few evidences from the emerging market. Based on this, we carried out 
a systematic review on studies on effects of liquidity on banks outcomes such as liquidity 
creation, risk-taking, and performance. This review indicated that liquidity standards reduce 
the banks’ risk-taking behaviour since it requires the banks to maintain more liquid assets. 
Banks’ liquidity has significant influence on their risk-taking behaviour, performance, and 
liquidity creation. However, most of the existing studies reviewed mainly focused on the 
conventional banking system. Hence, this study points out the need to explore the nature of 
the relationship between funding liquidity and the bank risk-taking behaviour by examining 
the relationship from more developing nations as well as the comparative studies between the 
developed and developing nations. Thus, regulators of banks would be adequately guided.  
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